

ABELARD: TEXTS ABOUT NAMING, SAYING, TRUTHMAKING

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ABELARD: DIALECTICA 2.1.2

(De Rijk 148.19–151.2)

Orationum autem hae quidem perfectae sunt, illae uero imperfectae. Perfectas autem illas dico quas Priscianus constructiones appellat, quarum uidelicet et partium recta est ordinatio et perfecta sensus demonstratio, ut *Homo currit*. Imperfecta autem est quae in dispositione dictionum competenti imperfectum sensum demonstrat, ut *Homo currens*. Competens enim est substantiui et adiectiui constructio, cum ad eundem casum, ad idem genus et eundem numerum copulantur. Sed nondum in eis completa est sensus perfectio. Adhuc enim praemissa oratione prolata suspensus audientis animus aliquid amplius audire desiderat, ut ad perfectionem sensus perueniat, ueluti *est*, aut aliquod aliud competens uerbum. Praeter uerbum namque nulla est sensus perfectio. Unde et omnes fere species perfectarum orationum ex uerbis suis nominantur, ut enuntiatiua, imperatiua et aliae, quas in diuisione perfectae orationis apponemus.

Opponitur autem fortasse de quibusdam orationibus perfectis, quae imperfectum habent sensum, ut haec: *Homo dedit* uel *dabit*. Quis enim homo, uel quid, uel cui, uel quando, uel ubi, uel quare dederit, indeterminatum relinquitur atque id adhuc audientis animus requirit; unde non aliter perfectus uidetur praemissae orationis intellectus nisi his omnibus determinatis.

Sed falso; qui enim dicit: *Homo* [\[149\]](#) *dedit*, etsi de homine indeterminate atque indefinite *dare* enuntiet, perfectum tamen secundum copulationem alterius ad alterum generat intellectum. Nec, quantum ad perfectionem sensus pertinet, requirendum ulterius est, quid uerbis illius orationis exprimitur.

Sed et mihi dicitur: similiter cum dicimus *homo currens*, *homo albus*, perfecta est in se oratio et plene eum qui ad se pertinet intellectum demonstrans, nec

Some expressions are complete, whereas others are incomplete. The expressions I call *complete* Priscian terms grammatical constructions, namely expressions for which there is a correct ordering of the parts and a complete display of the sense, for example “A human being runs.” An incomplete expression is one which, in a suitable arrangement of its words, displays an incomplete sense, for example “A human being running.” There is a suitable grammatical construction of a substantive and an adjective when they are connected in the same grammatical case, in the same gender, and in the same number, but the completeness of the sense has not yet been fulfilled in them. When the aforementioned expression has been spoken, the listener’s mind in a state of suspense still wants to hear something more, so as to arrive at the completeness of the sense — such as ‘is’ or some other suitable verb. Apart from a verb there is surely no completeness of the sense. Accordingly, practically all the kinds of complete expressions are given names on the basis of their verbs — e. g. ‘constative’, ‘imperative’, and the others we set out in the division of the complete expression.

Now perhaps an objection is raised about some complete expressions that have an incomplete sense, such as “A human being gave it” and “A human being will give it.” Which man, or what he will have given, or to whom, or when, or where, or why remains indeterminate, and the listener’s mind is still missing this. Accordingly, the understanding of the aforementioned expression doesn’t seem complete unless all these matters are settled.

Well, this is false. Although the person who says “A human being gave it” indeterminately and indefinitely states of a human being that he gives it, it nevertheless generates a complete understanding due to the connection of the one to the other. Nor, so far as it pertains to the completeness of the sense, is anything more required than what is expressed in the words of the expression.

But then this objection is made to me: “Likewise, when we say ‘running human being’ or ‘white human being’ the expression is complete in itself and fully

quicquam de eo quod ad ipsam pertinet, ulterius est requirendum, et quaedam insuper inhaerentia cursus uel albedinis ad hominem in ea exprimitur. Cum enim cursum uel albedinem circa hominem per *currens* uel *album* determinamus, quamdam procul dubio cohaerentiam accidentis ad fundamentum secundum adiacentiam innuimus.

Sed dico hoc ad perfectionem orationis non sufficere, ut quasi adiacentem homini albedinem uel cursum determinemus, nisi etiam adiacere dicamus, quod sine uerbo fieri non contingit. In hoc enim uerbum a participio abundat quod non solum personam per impositionem demonstrat aut ei cohaerentem actionem uel passionem significat, uerum etiam cohaerere dicit; ex qua quidem demonstratione inhaerentiae modus enuntiatuus indicatiuus est nominatus, quod uidelicet per ipsum solum aliquid alicui inhaerere siue inhaesisse seu inhaesurum esse proponamus.

Perfectio itaque sensus maxime pendere dinoscitur in uerbis, quibus solis alicuius ad aliquid inhaerentia[m] secundum uarios affectus animi demonstratur; praeter quam quidem inhaerentiam orationis perfectio non subsistit. Cum enim dico: *Veni ad me* uel *Utinam uenires ad me*, quodammodo inhaerentiam ueniendi ad me propono secundum iussum meum uel desiderium meum, in eo scilicet quod iubeo illi ut uenire ei cohaereat, uel desidero¹ ut ipse ueniat.

Unde et saepe in consequentiis uerba optatiui modi uim enuntiatui tenent, ueluti cum ita propono *Si fuisses hic, uidisses eum* tam bene enim haec consequentia dici potest sicut ea quae ex enuntiationibus iungitur hoc modo: *Si fuisti hic, uidisti eum*. Unde et cum quidam de illa assumunt ac concludunt, partes eius in enuntiationes resoluunt, sic: *Sed fuisti hic; quare uidisti eum* uel ita: *Sed non uidisti; quare non fuisti*.

Infinitiuo quoque uerbo quodammodo [150](#) inhaerentia exprimi uidetur; ut cum ita dicimus: *Verum est Socratem currere uel possibile*; tale est enim ac si dicamus *Verum est uel possibile quod Socrates currit*, id est quod cursus Socrati

displays the understanding pertaining to it; nor is anything further required of that which pertains to it, and additionally a certain inherence of a running or of whiteness to a human being is expressed in it. For when we determine running or whiteness as regards a human being by ‘running’ or ‘white’, we are without a doubt suggesting a certain coherence of an accident with its foundation according to adjacence.”

I reply that it isn’t enough for the completeness of the sense that we determine whiteness or running as though they were adjacent to a human being unless we were also to *say* that it is adjacent. This can’t happen without a verb. Indeed, the verb goes beyond the participle in this regard: not only does it (*a*) display a grammatical person by its imposition, and (*b*) signify an action or an undergoing that coheres with [the subject], but furthermore (*c*) it *says* that they cohere. The constative mood is named ‘indicative’ due to this display of inherence, since only by the verb do we propose that something inheres or did inhere or will in inhere in another.

Therefore, we recognize that completeness of sense depends on verbs in particular, and they alone display the inherence of something in another according to various mental affections; completeness of sense doesn’t obtain apart from this inherence. When I say “Come to me!” or “Would that you come to me!” I somehow propose an inherence of coming-to-me according to my command or my desire, namely in that I command that person so that *coming* coheres with him, or I desire that he come.

Accordingly, in consequences, too, verbs in the optative mood often keep their constative force. For example, when I propose “If you were to have been here, you would have seen him” we can say this consequence just as correctly as one put together out of statements like so: “If you were here, you saw him.” Accordingly, when some people provide a minor premiss and then draw a conclusion from it, they resolve the parts of it into statements, as follows: “But you were here; therefore, you saw him” (or like so: “But you did not see him; therefore, you were not here”).

The infinitive verb also seems to express inherence in some fashion. When we say “It is true (or: It is possible) for Socrates to run,” for example, it’s as if to say “It is true (or: possible) that Socrates runs,” *i. e.* that *running* coheres with Socrates by being adjacent. However, the expression “That Socrates runs” is not complete, as the ones put forward above are. Yet it seems to express the

¹ The manuscript reads *desidero id est*.

adiacendo cohaereat. Nec tamen haec perfecta est (sicut suprapositae) oratio *Socratem currere*; sensum tamen propositionis in eo quod uerum uel falsum monstrat, uidetur exprimere idemque enuntiare quod *Socrates currit*. Sicut enim haec proponit Socratem currere, quod uel falsum uel uerum significat, sic et illa. Nec tamen propositio dicitur, licet uerum significet.

Si Socratem currere uerum est, ipsa autem Socratem currere significat, ipsa profecto uerum demonstrat. Unde et ex definitione propositionis, quam in sequentibus dabimus, propositionem eam oportet esse; unde et orationem perfectam, cum scilicet perfectum sensum significat.

sed si nos quidem subtilius rei ueritatem intueamur, nec iam orationem eam dicemus, immo quasi nomen illius quod propositione exprimitur, cui quidem per impositionem rectam applicetur, sicut *homo* uel *homo albus* homini. Non enim aliter per *est* uerbum aliquid ei uel ipsum alicui coniungeretur, nisi per impositionem subiectae rei datum esset. Sic quoque et cum dicimus '*Socrates currit*' uerum est, '*Socrates currit*', quod in subiecto proferimus, propositio non est, sed nomen eius cui uerum attribuitur. Si autem '*Socratem currere*' uerum per impositionem habeat designare, non omnino propositionis significationem tenet, quae scilicet significatio in dicendo est, non in nominando, ut in expositione definitionis propositionis aperiemus. Sed licet, cum dicimus *Socratem currere uerum est*, '*Socratem currere*', quod in subiecto propositionis profertur, nomen sit, cui scilicet uerum coniungitur, illud tamen quod per se proferimus, *Socratem currere*, oratio poterit esse, sed, ut dictum est, imperfecta, cum uidelicet nullam personalis uerbi resolutionem habeat. Sic quoque et *animal rationale mortale*, cum hominis definitio perfecta dicatur, nullo tamen modo perfecta conceditur oratio. Cum enim in definiendo perfectionem habeat, eo uidelicet quod omni et soli ac specialiter homini conueniat, in dicendo aliquid nullam perfectionem seruat, quae perfectio propria est orationum, nihilque de proprietate orationis praeter constitutionem tenet; sed potius nominis impositionem habet, ex qua etiam praedicari et subici potest. [\[151\]](#)

Atque haec quidem de perfecta uel imperfecta orationum sententia dicta sufficiant.

sense of a sentence in pointing out a truth or falsehood, and it seems to state the same as "Socrates runs." For just as the latter proposes that Socrates runs, which signifies either a truth or a falsehood, so too does the former. But "That Socrates runs" is not called a sentence, even though it signifies a truth.

Yet if "That Socrates runs" is true and it signifies that Socrates runs, then surely it displays a truth. Accordingly, in line with the definition of the sentence (which we'll give shortly), it must be a sentence; accordingly, it is also a complete expression, namely because it signifies a complete sense.

Well, if we should look into the truth of the matter in a more subtle fashion, then we won't call it a sentence but instead sort of a name of what is expressed by a sentence, to which it is applied by means of a correct imposition, like 'human being' or 'white human being' is to a human being. For nothing is conjoined by the verb 'is' to it, nor it to anything in any way other than giving it to a thing as its subject through imposition. So too when we say "Socrates runs' is true": the 'Socrates runs' we utter as the subject is not a sentence but rather the name of that to which truth is attributed. But if 'that Socrates runs' were to have the feature of designating truth through imposition, it doesn't in any way possess the signification belonging to a sentence; this signification is in *saying*, not in *naming*, as we'll clarify in the analysis of the definition of the sentence. But even though when we say "That Socrates runs is true" the 'that Socrates runs' which is uttered in the subject of the sentence is a name, namely one to which 'true' is conjoined, nevertheless what we utter on its own, "That Socrates runs," will be able to be an expression — but, as said earlier, an incomplete one, since it doesn't resolve into a personal verb. So too even though 'rational mortal animal' is called the complete definition of human being, nevertheless the expression isn't in any way granted to be complete. For although it has completeness in defining [the term], namely in that it is suitable to all and to only and especially to human being, it doesn't hold any completeness in saying something, which is the completeness proper to expressions, and it doesn't possess any distinctive property of an expression apart from its make-up, but rather has the imposition belonging to a name, in virtue of which it can also be predicated and put as a subject.

Let these remarks about the complete and incomplete meaning of expressions be sufficient.

[1] ORATIO EST VOX SIGNIFICATIVA CUIUS PARTIUM ALIQUID SIGNIFICATIVUM EST SEPARATUM. [*De int.* 4 16^b26–27 *Arist. lat.* 2.1–2 7.20–8.1]

Definitis et tractatis partibus orationis congruo ordine definit et tractat orationem, quippe oratio ex eis tam constitutionem suam quam significationem contrahit.

[2] *Ad placitum* uero subintellige et in definitione orationis sicut et partium, alioquin tota definitio conueniret latratui canis, qui in pluribus partibus constat, quarum unaquaeque iram canis designat. [3] Ipse uero in sequentibus separatim ponit “ad placitum,” quia in eo aliquantulum immorandum erat propter quorundam Platoniorum sententiam, qui uolebant omnes quoque uoces significanti ad placitum significare naturaliter, quia scilicet instrumenta erant intellectuum, qui sunt naturales. Quam sententiam prius auferre uoluit quam *ad placitum* orationi tribueret. [4] Et nota aliud *ad placitum* esse partium, aliud esse totius orationis, quia sicut nomen et uerbum habent per se suam institutionem, ita oratio propriam. Cum enim nomina et uerba iam inuenta essent et instituta [130] ad significandum, postea secundum singulos constructionum modos coniuncta sunt in oratione et ipsa oratio totaliter instituta est ad aliquem sensum. [5] Unde facta est discretio casuum uel generum uel personarum, ut conuenienter genus generi uel casus casui uel persona personae coniuncta sensum aliquem exprimat, et cum *Socrates est homo* sit instituta ad sensum, *Socrates est hominem* ad nullum. Licet enim *hominem* et *homo* eiusdem penitus sint significationis, non eiusdem sunt constructionis, et haec constructionum est inuenta, ut certum sensum ex ea habeamus, illa uero ad nullum. [6] Unde non quaelibet dictionum collectio oratio dici potest, nisi sit competens coniunctio, ut aliquem sensum exprimere queat; ut, si dicam *homo lapis* uel *albus crispus* uel *hominem uenit*, multae quidem sunt dictiones sed non ad unum sensum institutae. [7] Unde Priscianus in primo Constructionum docet orationem non posse dici nisi comprehensionem dictionum aptissime ordinarum: “Quemadmodum,” inquit, “litterae apte coeuntes” etc. et rursus: “Est enim,” inquit, “oratio comprehensio dictionum aptissime ordinarum,” ut uidelicet secundum

[1] THE EXPRESSION IS A SIGNIFICATIVE UTTERANCE, SOME PART OF WHICH IS SIGNIFICATIVE WHEN SEPARATED.

Now that the parts of an expression have been defined and discussed in the appropriate order, Aristotle defines and discusses the expression, for the reason that the expression takes its signification as well as its make-up from its parts.

[2] Understand ‘conventionally’ as implicit in the definition of the expression, as it was for its parts. Otherwise, the whole definition would be suitable to a dog’s barking, which consists of many parts, any one of which designates the dog’s anger. [3] Now Aristotle himself puts ‘conventionally’ separately in [*De int.* 4 17^a2] because he had to pause for a little bit on this point due to the view of some of Plato’s followers, who held that all conventionally significant utterances also signify naturally, on the grounds that they are the instruments of understandings, which are natural. Aristotle wanted to get rid of this view before attributing ‘conventionally’ to the expression. [4] Note that it is one matter for ‘conventionally’ to belong to the parts of an expression and another matter to belong to the whole expression. For just as the name and the verb have their own institution of themselves, so too does the expression. Indeed, although names and verbs were devised and instituted in order to signify, subsequently, according to the grammatical mode belonging to each, they are conjoined in an expression, and the expression itself is instituted in such a way for some sense. [5] Accordingly, the distinction of cases or genders or persons has been framed so that gender suitably conjoined to gender, or case to case, or person to person, express some sense. Although “Socrates is a human being” is instituted for a sense, “Socrates is a that-human-being” isn’t instituted for any sense. Even though ‘human being’ and ‘that-human-being’ have exactly the same signification, they don’t have the same grammatical construction; the former is devised so that we have a definite sense from it, whereas the latter is not devised for any sense. [6] Accordingly, not just any collected words can be called an expression, unless there is a suitable conjunction so that it can express some sense. For example, if I were to say “human being stone” or “white

regulas iuncturae aliquem sensum proferre possit.

[8] Nota quod diligenter ait ALIQUID PARTIUM et non ‘partes’, quia *de homine* oratio est et unam tantum partem significatiuam habet, id est aptam ex inuentione sua ad significandum per se.

[9] Sed cum SIGNIFICATIVUM, ut supra exposuimus, contineat *per se*, quare supponit SEPARATUM? Ad explanationem quidem, [131] non ad determinationem. Vel fortasse sic dici poterit: Pars orationis est significatiua separata, id est significationem habet extra, quam pars orationis manens exercebat. At uero pars dictionis extra significationem non habet, quam pars dictionis manens exercebat.

[10] Notandum tamen de figuratiuis orationibus, quod saepe nulla dictio quae in ipsis posita est, in ea significatione accipitur, quam habet extra ex propria inuentione, ueluti si pro aliquo potentissimo minante dicam: *Leo rugit* uel *Tonat Iupiter*. Sed licet per translationem uoces ex propria significatione ad aliam accommodentur, tamen propria eorum significatio propter quam inuentae sunt, siue dictiones siue orationes, hic pensanda est. Quippe translatio accidentalis est et nullius proprietatis. Cum ergo dico *Leo rugit* uel *fremit* pro *Potens minatur*, ad quemcumque sensum per translationem dictionum oratio accommodetur, semper partes ex propria inuentione idem habent significare extra quod intra, id est leonem et rugitum, licet ad alium sensum per figuram accommodentur. Hic uero de propria significatione quae est ad placitum, id est per propriam uocis institutionem, non per translationis abusionem, agitur. Unde, cum dicitur oratio figuratiua, in his uerbis et proprietates rectae significationis exprimitur, cum dicitur *oratio*, et abusio figurae, cum dicitur *figuratiua*, id est impropria secundum praesentem acceptionem.

curly” or “he comes that-human-being,” there are in fact many words, but they are not instituted for one sense. [7] Accordingly, Priscian teaches that only a suitably ordered combination of words can be called an expression; he says “In the same manner as letters suitably go together...” (*Inst. gramm.* [2 108.9]), and again “For an expression is a combination of words that are most suitably ordered” (*Inst. gramm.* 2 108.24), that is, ordered so that according to the rules of combination the words can express some sense.

[8] Note that Aristotle carefully says SOME OF THE PARTS and not simply ‘parts’. The reason for this is that “about human being” is an expression and it has only one significative part, *i. e.* one part that is suitable on the basis of its invention to signify of itself.¹

[9] But since SIGNIFICATIVE contains ‘of itself’, as we explained previously, why does Aristotle add WHEN SEPARATED to his definition? Well, he does so as an explanation, not as a determination. Alternatively, perhaps the question would be answered as follows: a part of an expression is SIGNIFICATIVE WHEN SEPARATED, that is, when it has a signification outside the expression which, while remaining part of the expression, it exercised. But part of a word does not have signification outside the word which, while remaining part of the word, it exercised.

[10] Note however with regard to figurative expressions that often no word put into them is taken in the signification that it has outside the figurative expression due to its proper invention. For example, if I were to say of some powerful person who is making threats: “The lion is roaring!” or “Jupiter is thundering!” But although utterances are altered from their proper signification to another one by transference, still, whether they are words or expressions, one ought to consider here the proper signification that belongs to them, according to which they have been devised. In fact, transference is accidental and characteristic of no distinctive property. Therefore, when I say “The lion is roaring!” or “The lion is growling!” in place of “A powerful person is making threats,” no matter what sense the expression is altered to through transference of the words, the parts of the expression, due to their proper invention, always have the feature that they signify the same inside the expression as as they do outside it — namely the lion and the roar — although they are altered to another sense through a figure

¹ In *de homine*, only *homine* < *homo* was devised “to signify of itself; the preposition *de* is purely consignificative and has no sense on its own.

[11] Illud etiam notandum quod quandoque contingit orationem totam ad placitum esse, nec tamen omnes eius partes significatiuae ad placitum significant, ut si dicam *Heu mihi!*; nam licet *heu* naturalis sit interiectio nec ad placitum significet, ex placito tamen hominis factum est, ut coniungeretur *mihi* ad dolorem cuiuscumque proferentis designandum, ut uidelicet dicamus *Heu mihi!*, non *Heu ei!*. Quod ita quia coniunctum est tali uoci in oratione ad [132] aliquid significandum secundum hominis uoluntatem, totam orationis compositionem ad placitum facit.

[12] Nunc autem quid orationes ad placitum significant, perquirendum est.

[13] Sed cum constet omnium communem significationem esse intellectuum, de qua supra satis docuimus, an sit alia significatio orationum, praeter scilicet intellectuum, uidendum est tam imperfectarum quam perfectarum. [14] Certum est autem de quibusdam imperfectis, ut sunt definitiones uel descriptiones, eas rerum significationem habere sicut et nomina habent, ut *animal rationale mortale* uel *animal risibile* ipsum quoque hominem significant, per quem et praedicari possunt et subici sicut nomen hominis.

[15] Perfectae uero orationes a quibusdam intellectum tantum compositum significare dicuntur, a quibusdam etiam res ipsas omnes simul quae significantur singillatim a partibus ipsarum, ueluti cum dicitur *Homo est animal* uel *Homo non est animal* uel *Si est homo, est animal*, haec propositio *Homo est animal* non solum intellectum compositum generat, uerum etiam totaliter hominem et animal simul significat in hoc habitu quod hoc est illud, et negatio *Homo non est animal* easdem res significat in eo quod hoc non est illud, et *Si est homo, est animal* in eo quod si hoc est, illud est.

of speech. Yet here we are concerned with their signification proper, which is conventional, that is, their signification through the proper institution of the utterance rather than through the abuse that is transference. Accordingly, when we say a figurative expression, we express both (a) what is appropriate to its correct signification, when it is called an expression, and (b) the abuse that is a figure of speech, when it is called figurative, that is, improper, according to the present acceptance.

[11] This point should also be noted: sometimes it happens that the expression as a whole is conventional, yet not all the significative parts of it signify conventionally — for instance, if I were to say “Ah me!” For although ‘Ah’ is a natural interjection and doesn’t signify conventionally, nevertheless it has been arranged on the basis of human convention that if it were conjoined to ‘me’ it designates the sorrow of whoever utters it, so that we say “Ah me!” but not “Ah him!” The fact that it’s conjoined in this way to such an utterance in an expression for signifying something according to human will makes the composition of the expression conventional.

[12] And now let’s thoroughly investigate what conventional expressions signify.

[13] But since it happens that the signification common to all conventional expressions is understandings (and we’ve settled enough about this signification earlier), let’s see whether there is another signification that belongs to expressions, incomplete as well as complete, apart from understandings. [14] Certainly some incomplete expressions, such as definitions or descriptions, have a signification of things, just as names do. For example, the definition ‘rational mortal animal’ or the description ‘risible animal’ also signify human being, and through this signification they can be predicated and put as subjects, just like the name ‘human being’.

[15] Some people say that complete expressions signify not only a composite understanding, but also to signify all together the things that are signified by each of their parts one-by-one. For example, when we say “A human being is an animal” or “A human being is not an animal” or “If it is a human being, it is an animal,” they hold that the sentence “A human being is an animal” generates not only a composite understanding, but it also totally signifies human being and animal together in the condition that *this* is *that*; the negation “A human being is not an animal” signifies the same things in that *this* is not *that*; and “If is it a human being, it is an animal” in that if *this* is, *that* is.

[16] Nos uero nolumus propositiones uel solos intellectus significare [133] uel res ipsas, sed cum significatione intellectuum quandam aliam significationem habere, quae nil est omnino, ueluti Socratem esse hominem uel non esse. Duo itaque uolumus significari a propositione, intellectum scilicet quem generat de rebus, et id insuper quod proponit et dicit, scilicet hominem esse animal uel non esse, quod, uidelicet hominem esse animal uel non esse, nullae omnino sunt essentiae neque una neque plures, quod postmodum ostendemus.

[17] Sed nunc prius monstremus non solos intellectus a propositionibus designari, uerum etiam alia, siue res sint siue nil omnino, sicut uolumus. [18] Cum quamlibet consequentiam uel aliquam propositionem necessariam dicimus — non in essentia sui quae transitoria est sed secundum suam significationem — oportet in significatione eius haberi, quod necessarium possumus appellare. [19] At uero nec intellectus propositionis in se necessitatem ullam habet, quod est actio transitoria. Aliud ergo oportet significari a propositione, pro quo necessaria dici possit, ueluti, cum istam consequentiam *Si est rosa, est flos* ueram semper etiam destructis rebus et necessariam concedamus, oportet uideri, pro quo significato necessaria iudicetur. At uero in rebus nihil est necessitatis; quibus etiam omnino destructis non minus necessarium est, quod a consequentia dicitur, id est si hoc est, illud esse.

[20] Sed fortasse dicitur, quod res etiam destructae in necessitate quadam consecutionis quam habent ad inuicem quodammodo sunt, secundum quem quidem consecutionis habitum ipsa consequentia dicitur ipsas res loqui. [21] Sed prius inquiremus, quid sit hic habitus, secundum quem consequentia significat res et ipsae [134] res necessariae dicuntur. Quod si aliquid est, uel est ipsae res, id est rosa et flos, uel aliud. Quod si est ipsae res, cum dicimus ipsas res in eo habitu necessarias, in se ipsis eas necessarias appellamus, quod falsum est, cum sint transitoriae. Quod si per hunc habitum aliquam proprietatem in rebus accipimus, in ea, quoque necessaria, non permanent, quia cum omnino non sunt, nec hanc proprietatem nec aliam habent. Cum itaque propositionem ex significatione necessariam iudicemus nec haec necessitas secundum intellectum siue secundum res accipi possit, oportet aliud ab eis designari. Unde uniuscuiusque propositionis dictum nullam omnino rem neque etiam plures concedimus esse.

[16] We for our part, however, hold that sentences do not signify either understandings alone or things themselves. Instead, along with their signification of understandings, they have another signification, which is absolutely nothing — for example, that Socrates is (or: is not) a human being. Thus we hold two things to be signified by a sentence: (a) the understanding that it generates of things, and further (b) what it proposes and says, namely that a human being is (or: is not) an animal. And (b), namely that a human being is (or: is not) an animal, are no things at all, neither one nor several, as we'll demonstrate later.

[17] But now first let's show that not only are understandings designated by sentences, but also something else, whether things or absolutely nothing (as we hold). [18] When we call any given consequence or sentence necessary — not in its essence, which is transitory, but according to its signification — we must consider it in its signification of what we are able to call necessary. [19] But the understanding that belongs to a sentence, which is a transitory action [of thinking], does not have any necessity in itself. Therefore, something else must be signified by the sentence, in virtue of which it can be called necessary. For example, since we grant the consequence “If it is a rose, it is a flower” to be always true and necessary, even when the things involved have been destroyed, we must see in virtue of what signification it is judged necessary. But there is no necessity in things, and even when the things involved have been absolutely destroyed, what is said by the consequence (namely ‘if *this* is, *that* is’) is nonetheless necessary.

[20] But perhaps it is objected that things, even when destroyed, somehow exist in virtue of a certain necessity of the entailment that they have to one another, and, according to the condition of the entailment, the consequence itself is said to speak about the things themselves. [21] But first let's inquire what this condition is according to which the consequence signifies things and the things themselves are called necessary. Now if the condition is something, it's either (a) the things themselves, the rose and the flower, or (b) something else. If (a), then when we call the things themselves necessary in this condition we're calling them necessary in themselves. But this is false, since they are transitory. If (b) and we take some distinctive property in things through this condition, they also do not persist in this property as necessary, since when they don't exist at all they have neither this property nor any other. Therefore, when we judge a sentence necessary in virtue of its signification, this necessity can't be taken according to the understanding or according to things. Something else must be

[22] Et fortasse in consequentiis et in negatiuis propositionibus hoc planum est, quod uerae sunt omnino rebus destructis, quia tunc quoque uere dici potest quod uerum est uel necesse est hoc non esse illud, sed non ita in affirmatiuis uidetur, qualis est *Socrates est homo*, quae nullo modo nisi re permanente uera esse potest. Unde fortasse in talibus res ipsae a propositione significari uidebuntur. [23] Sed iam profecto *Socrates est Socrates* unum Socratem designabit, sicut et nomen ipsum quod est *Socrates*, et eodem modo, quippe *Socrates* ipsum significat in eo quod Socrates est. Nec tamen dicit ipsum esse Socratem, sicut *Socrates est Socrates* dicit. Unde in dicto propositionis differentiam habet ipsa a nomine, quod uidelicet propositio dicit *Socrates est Socrates*, quod non est aliqua essentia, *Socrates* uero id non dicit, licet Socratem nominet secundum hoc quod est Socrates.

[24] Praeterea si non esset alia significatio propositionum praeter rerum et intellectuum significationes, nequaquam diuersae essent in sensu *Socrates est currens* et *Socrates currit*.

[25] Amplius cum necessitatem consequentiae assignantes dicimus non posse esse id quod dicit antecedens sine eo quod dicit [135] consequens, neque secundum intellectum neque secundum res teneri potest, ueluti cum dicimus: *Si corpus non est animal, corpus non est homo*, neque uerum est dicere hunc intellectum sine illo non posse haberi neque res illius sine re huius. Sed non potest contingere ita ut prior dicit, quin sit ita, ut dicit posterior.

[26] Sicut ergo nomina et uerba duplicem significationem habent, rerum scilicet uel intellectuum, ita etiam concedimus duplicem esse propositionum, intellectus scilicet compositos ex intellectibus partium et dicta earum, quae sunt quasi res propositionum, cum tamen nullae penitus essentiae sint. Secundum quae dicta ipsae maxime uerae uel falsae iudicantur siue oppositae siue necessariae uel possibiles, quia uidelicet dicta earum uera sunt uel falsa uel opposita inuicem uel necessaria uel possibilia, ut *Verum est Socratem esse hominem* et *non esse lapidem*, et *Falsum est ipsum non esse hominem* et *esse lapidem*, hoc est: Ita est in re quod est homo et non est lapis, et Non est ita in re quod non sit homo

designated by sentences. Accordingly, we grant that what any given sentence whatsoever says to be no thing at all, not even many things.

[22] And perhaps this is obvious in consequences and in negative sentences, which are true when the things involved have been completely destroyed, since at that point too we can say truly that “It is true (or: It is necessary) that *this* is not *that*.” But this seems not to be so in the case of affirmative sentences, such as “Socrates is a human being,” which can’t in any way be true unless the thing persists. Thus perhaps in such cases things themselves will seem to be signified by the sentence. [23] But then “Socrates is Socrates” will surely designate the one Socrates, just as the name ‘Socrates’ does, and in the same way. Indeed, ‘Socrates’ signifies him in that he is Socrates. Yet it doesn’t say that he is Socrates, as “Socrates is Socrates” says. Accordingly, in what the sentence says there is this difference from the name, *viz.* that the sentence says “Socrates is Socrates” — which is not any thing — whereas ‘Socrates’ does not say this, though it names Socrates in that he is Socrates.

[24] Besides, if there weren’t any signification belonging to sentences apart from the significations of things and of understandings, “Socrates running” and “Socrates runs” wouldn’t be different in sense at all.

[25] Furthermore, when we assign necessity to a consequence, we declare that what the antecedent says cannot be without what the consequent says. This can’t be taken either according to the understanding or according to things. For example, when we say “If a body is not an animal, a body is not a human being,” it is neither true to say that this understanding cannot be had without that one, nor a thing which belongs to the antecedent [cannot exist without] a thing which belongs to the consequent. But it cannot so happen as the antecedent says unless it be so as the consequent says.

[26] Therefore, just as names and verbs have a twofold signification, namely of things or of understandings, so too we grant that there is a twofold signification belonging to sentences: (*a*) the understandings composed out of the understandings of the parts of the sentences, and (*b*) what sentences say, which are sort of the ‘things’ belonging to sentences, although they are nevertheless no things at all. Sentences are especially judged to be true or false, or opposites, or necessary or possible, according to what they say, namely because what they say are true or false, or opposite to one another, or necessary or possible. For example, “It is true that Socrates is a human being (*or: is not a stone*)” and “It is

et sit lapis.

[27] Quod enim ex dictis suis propositiones uerae uel falsae dicendae sunt, plane Aristoteles ostendit, cum in Priori ait: “In eo enim quod res est aut non est, uera oratio dicatur aut falsa necesse est.” Qui etiam dicta propositionum res earum appellat, cum dicit in eodem rem esse causam ueritatis propositionum, ut quod Socrates est homo uel quod non est lapis, causa est, cur uerae sunt propositiones, [136] quae ita proponunt. Qui etiam dicta propositionum iacentia sub affirmatione et negatione uocauit et opposita inuicem, ut sedere Socratem teste Boethio ad non sedere Socratem, secundum quae etiam dicta ipse affirmationem et negationem semper uerum et falsum diuidere dicit, siue scilicet res sint siue non, quia uidelicet semper eorum quae dicuntur ab affirmatione et negatione diuidente alterum est in re et alterum etiam non est. Unde et in primo Peri ermenias ostendens proprietatem contradictionis dicit, quoniam “necesse est semper alteram contradictionis partem esse ueram et alteram falsam,” quia semper necesse est contingere in re alterum dictorum earum uel esse scilicet uel non esse.

[28] Quod si ea quae dicuntur ab affirmatione et negatione res essent, non esset uerum semper alterum esse et alterum non esse, quippe nulla alia res in negatione continetur quam in affirmatione, quia de eisdem penitus fieri debent.

[29] Amplius. Si res ipsae essent quae dicuntur a propositionibus, cum dicimus: *Si est homo, est animal*, et assumendo constituimus negationem consequentis ita: *Sed non est animal*, quod rebus etiam destructis contingit, non res aliquas ponimus sed ita esse concedimus, ut dicit negatio. Quod si negatio res ipsas diceret, ut concederemus esse, ut dicit negatio, oporteret nos concedere res ipsas esse. Unde nec uera posset esse negatio, id est dicere id quod in re sit, nisi res essent, cum potius Aristoteles dicat destructis rebus negationem esse ueram.

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false that Socrates is not a human being (*or: is a stone*),” *i. e.* it is so in reality that he is a human being (*or: is not a stone*), and it is not so in reality that he not be a human being (*or: that he be a stone*).

[27] Aristotle clearly shows that sentences should be called true or false on the basis of what they say when he says: “For an expression must be called true or false in that the thing is or is not” [Cat. 12 14^b20–22]. Aristotle also calls what sentences say their ‘things’ when in the same passage he says that a thing is the cause of the truth of sentences [Cat. 12 14^b18–20]. For example, that Socrates is a human being and that Socrates is not a stone is the cause why the sentences which so propose are true. He also described the *dicta* of sentences as underlying the affirmation and the negation, or as opposite to one another [Cat. 10 12^b9–10] — for example, that Socrates is sitting, according to Boethius’s testimony, is opposite to that Socrates is not sitting [In Cat. 272C]. Aristotle even says that the affirmation and the negation always divide what is true and false in accordance with what sentences say, whether they be things or not, because of what dividing affirmations and negations say,² one is in reality and the other one is not. Accordingly, when pointing out the distinctive property of a contradiction, Aristotle also says that it’s always necessary for one part of a contradiction to be true and the other false, since it is always necessary that one of what they say happen in reality, namely that it is or is not [De int. 9 19^a35–36].

[28] But if what the affirmation and the negation say were things, it wouldn’t be true always that one is and the other is not. Indeed, no other thing is contained in the negation than in the affirmation, since they should be framed regarding exactly the same things.

[29] Furthermore, if things themselves were what sentences say, then when we say “If it is a human being, it is an animal” and in the minor premiss set up the negation of the consequent as follows: “But it is not an animal” (which happens when the things in question are destroyed), then we don’t postulate any things but instead grant it to be so as the negation says. However, if the negation were to say things themselves, in order that we might grant it to be as the negation says we must also grant that the things themselves exist. Accordingly, the negation couldn’t be true, *i. e.* say what is in reality, unless the things were to exist — despite the fact that Aristotle says that the negation is true even when the things

² A dividing affirmation and negation are a pair of sentences that give an exclusive and exhaustive division.

[30] Praeterea si res ipsas in necessitate iungeremus, cum dicimus: *Si Socrates est Socrates, Socrates est homo*, non uideo quis sit sensus magis quam si diceretur: *Si Socrates est ens Socrates, Socrates est ens homo*. Et cum propositiones secundum sensum negaremus per destructionem consequentis et antecedentis, profecto per totam propositionem, cum negaremus Socratem esse <hominem> uel Socratem esse Socratem, negaremus duas res uel unam. Sed quid haec uerba portendent *Nego Socratem et hominem* uel *ipsum Socratem*, non comperio.

[31] Praeterea si *Socrates est homo* Socratem et hominem significet, ut de eis agatur, cum dicitur *Verum est Socratem esse hominem* uel *esse asinum*, id est: In re est quod Socrates est homo uel asinus, per illud *est uerum* quod praedicatur rebus ipsis coniungimus, ut uidelicet Socratem et hominem, res ipsas, uerum esse dicamus, id est in re esse. Sed quid est in re esse, nisi res ipsae? Quod si ita est, profecto et cum dicitur *Verum est Socratem esse asinum*, id est: In re est, tale est ac si dicatur Socratem et asinum res esse, quod uerum est, et ita propositio quae id proponit uera est, haec scilicet: *Verum est Socratem esse asinum*.

[32] Adeo autem uerum est ea quae dicuntur a propositionibus non esse res aliquas, quod cum dicimus Socratem et Platonem conuenire in esse hominem uel non esse in subiecto, si hoc in rebus accipimus, nulla res assignari poterit, in qua conueniant, sicut super Porphyrium docuimus.

[33] Amplius cum dicimus *Socrates in eo quod homo est rationalis est sed in eo quod animal est non est rationalis*, si per *esse hominem* rem hominis accipiamus et per *esse animal* rem animalis, profecto conuenit, ut si ex hoc *homine* hoc habeat, ex *animali* idem habeat, quia si natura hominis hoc ei confert, et natura animalis, quia ipse homo animal est.

[34] Praeterea cum dicimus *Possibile est uiuum esse mortuum*, falsum est.

[35] *Esse* itaque uel *non esse*, istae uerba² in orationibus positae, eas ad talia

² Reading *uerba* for *uoces*, on the basis of sense.

involved have been destroyed.

[30] Besides, if we were to join things themselves in necessity when we say “If Socrates is, Socrates is a human being,” I don’t see what the sense is more than if we were to say “If Socrates is Socrates a being, Socrates a human being being.” And since we deny sentences according to their sense through the destruction of the consequent and the antecedent, then surely through the whole sentence, since we deny that Socrates is a human being or that Socrates is Socrates, we would deny either one or two things. But I do not fathom what these words “I deny Socrates and human being” (*or*: “I deny Socrates himself”) mean.

[31] Besides, if “Socrates is a human being” were to signify Socrates and human being in order to deal with them, when we say “It is true that Socrates is a human being (*or*: an ass),” *i. e.* it is in reality that Socrates is a human being or an ass, by the ‘It is true’ we join together what is predicated to things themselves, so as to say that it is true that things themselves, namely Socrates and human being — that is, are in reality. But what is it to be in reality if not the things themselves? And if this is so, then surely when we say “It is true that Socrates is an ass,” *i. e.* it is in reality, it’s such as if to say that Socrates and an ass are things, which is true, and thus the sentence that proposes it, namely “It is true that Socrates is an ass,” is true.

[32] What is more, it’s true that what sentences say are not any things, because when we say that Socrates and Plato agree in being human beings or in not being in a subject, if we take this in things, no thing will be able to be given in which they agree, as we established in discussing Porphyry.³ |138|

[33] Furthermore, when we say “Socrates, in that he is a human being, is rational, but in that he is an animal he is not rational,” if through ‘being human’ we were to take a human as a thing and through ‘being animal’ we were to take an animal as a thing, then surely it’s appropriate that if he have this in virtue of ‘human being’ he have the same in virtue of ‘animal,’ since if the nature *human being* confers this on him, so too does the nature *animal*, since this human being is an animal.

[34] Besides, when we say “It is possible that something alive is dead,” it is false.

[35] Thus when these verbs ‘to be’ or ‘to not-be’ are put into expressions,

³ See *Logica ‘ingredientibus’* 1.01 (Geyer 19.29–20.14).

dicta detorquent, quae nil omnino dici possunt.

[36] Sed opponitur, cum dicta propositionum nil sunt, quomodo propter ea contingat propositiones esse ueras, quia haec quae nil omnino sunt uel esse possunt, quomodo dici causa possint? [37] Sed propter tractatum furtum homo suspenditur, quod tamen furtum iam nil est, et moritur homo, quia non comedit, et damnatur, quia non bene agit. Non comedere tamen uel non bene agere non sunt essentiae aliquae. Unde Augustinus ad Paulum et Eutropium in libro *De natura et gratia*, cum nullam essentiam peccatum esse diceret et tamen uitare substantiam, similitudinem hanc inducit de abstinere a cibo, quod non sit substantia, id est de non comedere, quod non sit ulla essentia, et tamen substantiam occidit uel debilitat, quia propter quod non comedit aliquis elanguescit uel etiam moritur.

[38] Sed et illud dicitur quod dum praecipitur alicui, quod faciat ignem uel non faciat, cum facere ignem uel non facere nil sit profecto, [139] id quod nil est ei iniungitur, hoc est datur ei mandatum de eo quod non est aliquid. Quippe nec ignis accensio, propter quam faciendam mandatum iniungitur, adhuc est, nec bona actio, de qua impio mandatur, [n]umquam futura est, non tamen ideo mandatum cessat nec iniustus est Deus qui punit uel damnat pro eo quod numquam est aliquid. [39] Notandum uero quod cum dicitur *Iubeo te facere ignem* et de facere ignem praeceptum sit, quod, uidelicet facere ignem, nil umquam esse uolumus, non tamen praecipitur, ut quis faciat facere ignem sed tantum, ut faciat ignem. Si quis autem dicat, quod qui praecipit facere ignem, cum facere ignem non sit aliquid, praecipit nil, sensus quidem potest esse sanus, quod de eo iniungit praeceptum, quod non est aliquid. Sed nulla est uis constructionis, quae dicit *Praecipit nihil*, sicut nihil esset dicere *Praecipio ignem faciendum*. [40] Saepe etenim uoces etiam illae quae eiusdem penitus significationis sunt, eandem constructionem non seruant, ut *uescor* et *comedo*, quae cum diuersis casibus construuntur intransitiue. *Careo* etiam et *non habeo* idem ualent, aliud tamen est dicere *Non habeo omnem cappam* et aliud *Careo omni*, id est: Nullam habeo. Similiter, licet *Socratem currere* et *Socrates currit* idem dicant, diuersas tamen habent constructiones, quia et si dicam *Possibile est* uel *Verum est Socratem currere* uel *ambulare*, ualet constructio, sed non ita *Possibile est Socrates currit*; uel si dicam *Si Socrates currit*, *Socrates ambulat*, ualet, si uero dicam *Si Socratem currere*, *Socratem ambulare* nil est.

they turn the expressions toward what are said, which can be called absolutely nothing.

[36] But an objection is raised: since what sentences say are nothing, how does it happen that sentences are true according to them, since how can they be called a cause given that they are and can be absolutely nothing? [37] Well, a person is hanged for a theft that has been committed. Yet this theft now is nothing. Someone dies because he does not eat, and is damned for not acting well. Yet not eating or not acting well are not any things. Accordingly, although Augustine said in his book *On Nature and Grace* that sin is no thing and yet harms substance, he brings in this example about abstaining from food, which is not a substance: *i. e.* not eating, which is not any thing, and nevertheless weakens or kills the substance, since someone becomes ill or dies in that he does not eat.

[38] But this point is also raised: when an order is given to someone that he make a fire or not make a fire, since making or not making a fire is certainly nothing, then he is enjoined to what is nothing — that is, a command is given to him about what isn't anything. Indeed, the lighting of a fire, for the sake of which the order that it be made was issued, doesn't even exist yet. Nor will the good action that an impious man is commanded to perform ever exist. Nevertheless, the command doesn't thereby become inactive; nor is God, Who punishes or damns on the basis of that which never is anything, unjust. [39] Yet note that when we say "I bid you to make a fire," then there is an order about making a fire, and we hold this (namely to make a fire) to always be nothing. Yet it is not ordered that someone make to make a fire but rather only that he make a fire. However, were anyone to object that he who orders making a fire orders nothing, for the reason that making a fire isn't anything — well, there can be a valid sense that a order is enjoined regarding what isn't anything. However, there is no force to the grammatical construction saying "He orders nothing," just as it would be nothing to say "I order fire to be made."⁴ [40] Often utterances which have exactly the same signification don't keep the same grammatical form, for example 'I feed on' and 'I eat', which are construed intransitively with different cases. Also, 'I lack' and 'I do not have' have the same meaning, yet it is one matter to say "I don't have every cloak" and another matter to say "I lack every

⁴ Abelard's point here is that orders have to be directed to those who carry them out, not to objects or desired states of affairs.

[41] Praeterea *nil* affirmatiue dici non potest de dicto propositionis, ut uidelicet dicam affirmatiue ipsum esse nihil sed negatiue non esse aliquid. Quid ergo mirum? Cum dicam impersonaliter *Contingit Socratem currere* non possum dicere *Contingit nil*. [140] Non enim sicut huiusmodi impersonalia uerba iunguntur cum infinitiuis uerbis, ita cum nominibus.

[42] De hac uero impersonalitate enuntiationis, sicut supra promisimus, hic dicendum est. [43] Ad quod illud praedicendum est, quod cum propositiones dicta sua proponendo significant, non tamen de eis intellectus constituunt. Nam nomina uel uerba uel orationes intellectus suos significant, non tamen de intellectibus alios iterum intellectus constituunt. Sic et propositiones dicta sua proponunt et intellectus compositos ex intellectibus partium constituunt. Unde oportet <per> propositiones non dicta intelligi sed res in intellectu completi.

[44] Nomen uero ipsius dicti, ut si dicam *hoc dictum*, quendam intellectum et simplicem de dicto constituit, sicut quodlibet nomen de re sua. Unde nomen dicti personalem facere enuntiationem potest, ueluti si dicam *Hoc dictum est aliquid* uel *non est aliquid*. [45] Si uero orationem subiciam, quae dictum continet, sed non de eo intellectum constituat, ut si dicam *Verum est* uel *Possibile est Socratem currere*, impersonalis est sensus et possibile est hoc totum uel uerum est, sicut *Ventum est* uel *Placitum est* impersonaliter ponitur et cum oratione construitur, quae scilicet oratio nil personaliter continet, cum nihil habeat subiectum, de quo intellectum constituat, ut diximus. Sicut ergo, cum dicimus [141] *Ventum est ad ecclesiam*, impersonalis est enuntiatio, ita *Possibile est uenire ad ecclesiam*.

cloak” (that is: I have no cloak). Likewise, although ‘that Socrates runs’ and ‘Socrates runs’ are called the same, they nevertheless have different grammatical forms. For if I were to say “It is possible (*or*: It is true) that Socrates runs (*or*: walks),” the sentence is well-formed, but not as follows: “It is possible Socrates runs.” Or, if I were to say “If Socrates runs, Socrates walks,” it is well-formed, whereas if I were to say “If that Socrates runs, that Socrates walks,” it is nothing.

[41] Besides, ‘nothing’ can be affirmatively said of what a sentence says, so that I might say affirmatively that it is nothing but negatively that it isn’t anything. What then is surprising in this? Though I say impersonally “It happens that Socrates runs,” I can’t say “It happens nothing,” for just as impersonal verbs of this sort are not joined with verbs in the infinitive, so too they aren’t joined with names.

[42] Here we should say something about the impersonality belonging to a statement, as we promised above. [43] We should declare first of all that although sentences signify by proposing what they say, they nevertheless do not constitute understandings of them. For names and verbs and expressions signify their understandings, yet the understandings do not again constitute other understandings. So too sentences propose what they say and constitute composite understandings out of the understandings of their parts. Accordingly, it’s necessary that through sentences what they say are not understood, but instead that things are comprehended in the understanding. [44] But the name ‘*dictum*’ itself — for example, if I were to say ‘this *dictum*’ — does constitute a certain simple understanding of what has been said, just as any given name does of its thing. Accordingly, the name ‘*dictum*’ can produce a personal statement, for instance were I to say “This *dictum* is something” or “This *dictum* is not anything.” [45] Yet if I were to put an expression as subject which contains a *dictum* but doesn’t constitute an understanding of it, for example were I to say “It is true that Socrates runs” or “It is possible that Socrates runs,” the sense is impersonal and the whole is possible or is true — just as “There is an arrival” or “It is pleasing” is put forward impersonally and construed with an expression which contains nothing personally, since it has nothing as the subject of which it constitutes the understanding, as we said. Therefore, just as when we say “There is an arrival at the church” the statement is impersonal, so too is “It is possible to arrive at the church.”

ABELARD: LOGICA INGREDIENTIBUS 2.12
(Geyer 289.36–293.36)

VIDETUR AUTEM PRAETER EOS QUI DICTI SUNT ALTER ESSE PRIORIS
MODUS: EORUM ENIM QVAE CONVERTUNTUR SECUNDUM ESSEN-
TIAE CONSEQUENTIAM, QUOD ALTERIUS QUOMODOLIBET CAUSA
EST DIGNE PRIUS NATURA DICITUR. [*Cat.* 12 14^b10–13; *Arist. lat.*
1.1–5 (ed. comp.) 76.10–13]

Ecce quintus, quem ex sua parte addit. Vere alia acceptio Prioris est a supra-
positis, quia ista quae secundum causam simpliciter accipitur. A parte.

Nota quod ad prioritatem sola causa uim habet, non etiam conuersio, immo
conuersio magis ad simul quam ad Prius pertinet. Et fortasse ideo exemplum
[290] posuit de eo qui conuertitur, quia per conuersionem uidetur tantum simul
esse et nullo modo prius. Vel iam etiam apposuit secundum conuersionem,
quia uoluit hanc speciem Prioris secundum naturam distinguere a secundo
modo Prioris, qui etiam sicut iste secundum naturam accipitur sed in hoc
tantum differt, quia ibi conuersio non est sicut hic. Puto enim apud Aristotelem
quattuor modos Prioris sufficere, secundum tempus scilicet, secundum ordinem,
secundum dignitatem, secundum naturam.

Secundum naturam autem illud proprie prius altero dicitur, quod sic ad alterum
se habet, ut ipsum naturaliter praecedat tamquam ipsius principium et causa,
sicut unum praecedit duo et euentus rei ueritatem propositionis et homo risibilis
et rationalis animal rationale et cygnus albedinem, cuius est fundamentum, et
omnis causa, sicut principium effectus dicitur, ita etiam prior naturaliter, etiam
finalis, quae alio respectu effectus est, quam quidem ipse quoque Boethius inter
propria quattuor principia numerat, ubi duo principia per accidens assignat,
tempus scilicet et locum. Omnis itaque causa sub Priori secundum naturam
eadem uidetur, siue inuicem conuertitur ad effectum, sicut hic dicitur, siue non,
sicut superius est ostensum.

Sed quia nimis stricte Prius secundum naturam acceperant, qui illud tantum

HOWEVER, IT SEEMS THAT THERE IS ANOTHER KIND OF PRIORITY
APART FROM THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN MENTIONED. FOR OF THOSE
THAT CONVERT ACCORDING TO A CONSEQUENCE OF THE ESSENCE,
THAT WHICH IS IN SOME FASHION THE CAUSE OF THE OTHER IS
RIGHTLY CALLED PRIOR BY NATURE.

Here's the fifth kind of priority, which Aristotle adds on his own behalf. It truly
is a different way of taking 'prior' from the foregoing kinds, since it's taken
according to the cause as such. The inference is from the part.

Note that the cause alone has this force with regard to priority, not also con-
uersion. Instead, conversion pertains more to simultaneity rather than priority.
Perhaps Aristotle gave an example of what converts for the reason that due
to conversion it seems to be only simultaneous and not in any way prior. Al-
ternatively, Aristotle added an example according to conversion because he
wanted to distinguish this type of priority according to nature from the second
kind of priority, which, like this one, is also taken according to nature — but
it differs a great deal in that there isn't any conversion in that case as there is
here. Along with Aristotle, I too think that four kinds of priority are sufficient,
namely priority according to (i) time, (ii) order, (iii) dignity, and (iv) nature.

Now according to nature, one thing is properly called prior to another which is
related to the the latter such that the former naturally precedes it, as if the former
were a principle and a cause of the latter, as *one* precedes *two*; the occurrence
of a state of affairs precedes the truth of a sentence; human being precedes the
risible; rational precedes rational animal; a swan precedes the whiteness whose
foundation it is. And just as every cause is called the principle of its effect, so
too it is naturally prior it — even the final cause, which is an 'effect' in different
manner, and which Boethius himself also lists among the four proper principles
where he assigns the two accidental principles time and place. Thus every cause
seems the same in nature, falling under the prior whether it converts with its
effect, as it is said to do here, or not, as shown above.

But since those philosophers who classify under 'prior by nature' only what

quod non conuertitur ad alterum, Priori supponebant, addidit hunc etiam modum Aristoteles supponi secundum naturam, qui cum superiori conueniat in eo quod natura prius dicitur, in eo a superiori exemplo ipsum diuidit, quod conuersionem assignat. In una tamen significatione Prioris natura³ tam iste modus qui in conuersione consistit quam ille qui non conuertitur, continetur.

Nota: cum dicitur ALTER ESSE PRIORIS MODUS, ‘alter’ pro ‘alius’ ponitur, quippe alter de duobus tantum dicitur, alius uero ad quemlibet numerum pertinet.

Vere alius est modus Prioris a suprapositis acceptionibus Prioris, quia iste qui est secundum conuersionem ita quod alterum est causa alterius, etsi nulla sit de quattuor causis. Sic construe: Alterum EORUM QUAE CONVERTUNTUR SECUNDUM CONSEQUENTIAM ESSENTIAE, id est comitationem permanentiae, QUOD ALTERIUS CAUSA EST QUOLIBET MODO, id est quaecumque causa, DIGNE, id est proprie, DICITUR. Quam exponit cum subdit: NATURA. Quaecumque enim natura priora sunt, proprie priora dicuntur utpote causae effectus suos ex se generantes.

QUIA VERO SUNT QUAEDAM HUIUSMODI, PALAM EST; ESSE NAMQUE HOMINEM CONVERTITUR SECUNDUM ESSE CONSEQUENTIAM AD VERAM DE SE ORATIONEM; NAM, SI EST HOMO, VERA ORATIO EST QUA DICIMUS QUIA EST HOMO, ET HOMO CONVERTITUR QUIA EST.
[*Cat.* 12 14^b 14–18; *Arist. lat.* 1.1–5 (ed. comp.) 76.13–17]

Vere quaedam conuertuntur inuicem tamquam causae et effectus, quia existentia⁴ hominis et ueritas propositionis, quae hominem esse enuntiat, hoc est ESSE HOMINEM CONVERTITUR AD ORATIONEM VERAM DE SE SECUNDUM CONSEQUENTIAM essentiae, id est comitationem alternae permanentiae, eo uidelicet quod oratione hac *Homo est* proponente hominem esse, non potest ipsa in eo esse uera, quin homo sit. Comitationem itaque Aristoteles [291] accepit inter ueri-

³ Reading *natura* for *naturam* (Geyer emends to *naturae*).

⁴ Reading *existentia* for *essentia*.

doesn’t convert with another do so too strictly, Aristotle added that this kind of priority is classified as according to nature. Although this kind agrees with the second kind above in that it is called naturally prior, Aristotle separates it from the second kind by his example which assigns conversion. Yet the kind that consists in conversion as well as the kind that doesn’t are contained in the single signification of ‘prior by nature’.

(Note: when Aristotle says that THERE IS ANOTHER KIND OF PRIORITY, his text has ‘the other’ in place of ‘another’ — for ‘the other’ is only said of two things, whereas ‘another’ pertains to any given number.)⁵

This fifth kind of priority is truly different from the ways of taking priority given above, since it’s the kind according to conversion such that the one is the cause of the other, though it isn’t among the four causes. Construe Aristotle’s text as follows: ONE OF THOSE THAT CONVERT ACCORDING TO A CONSEQUENCE OF THE ESSENCE, *i. e.* according to an association of permanence, WHICH IS IN SOME FASHION THE CAUSE OF THE OTHER, *i. e.* any given cause, IS RIGHTLY, *i. e.* properly, CALLED prior — which Aristotle explains when he adds on BY NATURE. For whatever things are prior by nature, they are properly called prior as causes generating their effects of themselves.

AND THAT THERE ARE SOME CASES OF THIS SORT IS CLEAR — SURELY THAT A HUMAN BEING EXISTS CONVERTS OF ITSELF WITH A TRUE EXPRESSION, ACCORDING TO A CONSEQUENCE OF THE ESSENCE; FOR IF A HUMAN BEING EXISTS, THE EXPRESSION “A HUMAN BEING EXISTS” BY WHICH WE SAY THAT A HUMAN BEING EXISTS IS TRUE, AND CONVERSELY, SINCE A HUMAN BEING EXISTS.

Some things truly convert with each other as causes and effects, since the existence of a human being and the truth of the sentence stating that a human being exists do so convert — that is, THAT A HUMAN BEING EXISTS CONVERTS OF ITSELF WITH A TRUE EXPRESSION, ACCORDING TO A CONSEQUENCE OF THE ESSENCE: there is a permanent reciprocal association in that when the expression “A human being exists” proposes that a human being exists, it cannot itself be true on this score unless a human being exists. Thus Aristotle accepts an association

⁵ Aristotle calls the fifth kind *alter* (appropriate to one of a pair) rather than *alius*.

tatem propositionis et euentum rei, oratione uerum uidelicet proponente, quod tamen ipse non determinat, quia sic de propositionibus agitur gratia sensus, quasi semper cum sensu permaneant.

Sunt autem quidam qui non solum consequentiam comitationis mutuam hic accipiunt, uerum etiam mutuam conditionalis differentiam, adhaerentes quidem uerbis auctoris, qui condicionalem apponit coniunctionem dicens: NAM SI EST HOMO etc., et alteram quidem consequentiam simpliciter quoque recipiunt, quae scilicet ex ueritate propositionis infert euentum rei, alteram uero cum constantia⁵ tantum, quae scilicet ex euentu infert ueritatem hoc modo: *Si uera est haec propositio “Homo est,” tunc homo est; Si homo est, uera est haec propositio, cum fiat.*

Sed ad haec dico quod similiter inter unum et duo possent mutuam consequentiam seruare uel inter animal et hominem, si uidelicet ex una parte constantiam uelint adiungere hoc modo: *Si duo sunt, unum est, Si unum est, cum alterum sit, duo sunt.* Et rursus: *Si Socrates est homo, est animal et Si est animal, cum sit risibile, est homo.* At uero Aristoteles, qui ueritatem propositionis sequi concedit de uno ad duo, consequentiam dicit non conuerti.

Praeterea si constantiam apponatur in altera parte, conuersio terminorum consequentiae non consistit, quia iam consequens non facit antecedens et antecedens consequens, cum uidelicet ipsam constantiam semper oporteat esse de antecedenti consequentiae cui apponitur, sicut alibi ostendendum est, ubi scilicet de hypotheticalis propositionibus disputabitur.

Nos autem non solum hanc consequentiam simpliciter factam reprobamus *Si homo est, uera est haec propositio “Homo est,”* eo uidelicet quod saepe contingit rem esse non facta propositione, uerum etiam conuersam calumniatur, hanc

⁵ Here and in what follows Geyer emends the manuscript reading *constantia* to *circumstantia*, not aware of the use of *constantia* to mean ‘nonemptiness’ in the logical literature of the time. I follow the manuscript reading throughout.

between the truth of the sentence and the occurrence of the state of affairs, *viz.* when an expression proposes a truth, which Aristotle nevertheless doesn’t spell out here since we’re dealing with sentences in this way in virtue of their sense, as if they were always to remain along with their sense.

However, there are some people who accept here not only the mutual consequence of association but also a mutual conditional difference, sticking to the words of Aristotle, who adds on a conditional conjunction, saying FOR IF A HUMAN BEING EXISTS... And they admit (*a*) the one consequence as such, namely the consequence that infers the occurrence of the state of affairs from the truth of the sentence, whereas they admit (*b*) the other consequence only with nonemptiness — that is, the consequence which infers the truth of the sentence from the occurrence, like so: (*a*) “If this sentence ‘A human being’ exists is true, then a human being exists”; (*b*) “If a human being exists, then the sentence ‘A human being exists’ is true as long as it is formulated.”⁶

Well, I reply to these remarks that they could likewise preserve a mutual entailment between *one* and *two*, or between *animal* and *human being*, if they wanted to add nonemptiness on one side like so: (*a*) “If there are two, there is one”; (*b*) “If there is one, as long as there is another, there are two.” And again: (*a*) “If Socrates is a human being, he is an animal”; (*b*) “If there is an animal, as long as it is risible, there is a human being.” But Aristotle, who grants the truth of the sentence from *one* to *two* to follow, says that the consequence doesn’t convert [*Cat.* 12 14^a29–30].

Besides, if nonemptiness were added in either part, the conversion of the terms belonging to the consequence doesn’t hold, since then the consequent doesn’t produce the antecedent nor the antecedent the consequent, because it would always be necessary that the nonemptiness itself belong to the antecedent of the consequence to which it is added, as is going to be shown elsewhere when hypothetical sentences are examined.

However, we for our part reject not only the consequence:

[T₁] If a human being exists, the sentence “A human being exists” is true

framed as such, since it often happens that the reality exists although the sen-

⁶ “As long as it is formulated”: *cum fiat*; see *Dialectica* 3.1.24 (371.32–36) for this reading.

scilicet: Si “*Homo est*” est uera (id est dicit tale quid quod in re est), tunc homo est. Videtur enim ea falsum sic extrahi: si quia *Homo est* dicit illud quod in re est, homo est, et quia *Homo est* dicit *Asinus est*, homo est, quamquam sequens consequentia ex nulla adiunctione naturae procedit.

Amplius si quia *Homo est* est uera, homo est, et quia *Homo est*, haec propositio, est haec alia propositio *Asinus est* homo est. Ubi similiter consequentia sequens omni natura consecutionis destituta est.

Unde omnino reprobanda esse uidetur haec quoque consequentia Si uera est “*Homo est*,” tunc *homo est* sicut eius conuersa simpliciter facta, quippe antecedens nullo modo ex se exigit consequens, cum uidelicet id quod haec propositio sit uera, hoc est dicat illud quod in re est, omnino propter aliud dictum contingere posset quam propter hoc quod est hominem esse.

Sed rursus fortasse erit qui eam probare contendat [292] hoc modo: Si *Homo est* est uera, hoc est dicit illud quod in re est, tunc illud quod in re est, dicitur ab ea et ita illud quod ab ea dicitur, est in re et ita hominem esse est in re a pari, unde et homo est. Itaque per medium ostensum est, quod si homo est, est uera *Homo est*.

Sed profecto secundum huiusmodi argumentationem posset ostendi solo Socrate existente filio Sophronici, quod si Sophronicus est pater alicuius, Socrates est, hoc modo: Si Sophronicus est pater alicuius, aliquis est filius Sophronici et ita filius Sophronici est aliquis; unde Socrates est aliquis a pari, et ita est. Itaque per medium ostensa est consequentia haec: Si *Sophronicus est pater alicuius*, *Socrates est*, quae nullo modo procedit. Unde refellenda est tam haec quam illa argumentatio.

Et illi quidem qui nimis dissimilitudini adhaerent in eo contradicere uolent, quod consequentiae actuales necessariis sunt adiunctae; paenultima namque in utraque argumentatione actuales sunt, caeterae necessariae uidentur.

tence isn’t formulated, but also we criticize its converse:

[T2] If “A human being exists” is true (*i. e.* says what in reality is), then a human being exists

It seems that a falsehood is extracted from [T2] like so: If a human being exists because “A human being exists says that which in reality is, then a human being exists because “A human being exists says “An ass exists” — although the following consequence⁷ doesn’t proceed from any adjunction of nature.

Furthermore, if a human being exists because “A human being exists” is true, then a human being exists because the sentence “A human being exists” is this other sentence “An ass exists” — where likewise the following consequence is destitute of any nature of entailment.

Accordingly, it seems that the consequence [T2] should also be completely rejected, just as its converse [T1] framed as such should be. Indeed, the antecedent does not in any way of itself require the consequent, since, for example, the fact that this sentence is true (*i. e.* says what in reality is) could happen entirely according to a *dictum* other than the *dictum* that a human being exists.

But again, perhaps there will be someone contending to prove [T2] in this way: if “A man exists” is true (*i. e.* says what in reality is), then what in reality is, is said by it, and so what is said by it is in reality, and so that a human being exists is equally in reality; accordingly, a human being exists. Thus it is shown through a middle that if “A human being exists” is true, a human being exists.

But surely on this line of argument it could be shown that, were Socrates to be the only existing son of Sophronicus, if Sophronicus is the father of someone, then Socrates exists, like so: if Sophronicus is the father of someone, someone is the son of Sophronicus; thus the son of Sophronicus is someone; accordingly, Socrates is equally someone, and so he exists. Therefore, the consequence “If Sophronicus is the father of someone, Socrates exists” is shown through a middle. But this consequence does not follow in any way. Accordingly, this line of argument is to be rejected as well.

Those philosophers who stick too much to dissimilarity want to object to this

⁷ That is, the consequence that a human being exists because “A human being exists” says “An ass exists”.

Nostra uero sententia, cum nullam fortasse de omnibus Prius modi consequentiis recipiat, quia uidelicet nullius antecedens ex se exigit consequens, easdem paenultimas maxime calumniatur quae solum actum respiciunt. Consequentiā itaque tantum hic accipe secundum comitationem accipimus, non secundum condicionem, et si recte ueritatem diiudicemus, ad tempus accomodari uidetur comitatio haec, quamdiu uidelicet propositio euentum rei proponit.

Sed inquiet aliquis, cur non etiam unum et duo similiter sese mutuo consequuntur ad tempus, quamdiu scilicet cum uno existit alterum, uel animal et homo, quamdiu risibile permanet?

Et nos quidem uerum id esse concedimus, quod illa quoque similiter sese comitantur ad tempus. Sed si nos hominum uisum atque acceptionem attendamus, quam Aristoteles maxime sequitur, uidentur sese semper comitari ueritas propositionis et euentus nec ad tempus hoc dici, quippe homines transitum uocum non attendentes, cum de propositionibus agunt gratia sensus, semper eas quasi existentes accipiunt, et tantundem ualet secundum eorum acceptionem *esse in re* quantum ueram esse propositionem quae illud dicit, ubi uocum inconstantiae non adhaerent nec tamen idem dicit *Homo est* quod dicit "*Homo est*" *est uera*, scilicet illa simpliciter euentum rei denuntiat, haec ueritatem propositioni copulat, alioquin alterum alterius causa non esset, si uidelicet idem penitus essent.

Sed cum diuersa sint nec in ueritatem semper sese comitantia, ponuntur tamen secundum hominum acceptionem ut semper simul contingentia. Aliter namque uoces secundum significationes, aliter secundum essentiam suam pensantur, ut iam alibi docuimus. Nam *Si homo est, uere homo est* conuertitur mutuo [293] ad "*Homo est*" *est uera*, quia scilicet ita est in re, quod dum homo est, uera est oratio qua dicitur quod homo est, et conuertitur, quia homo est, id est hoc quod homo est, conuertitur, subaudis ad ueritatem propositionis. A pari uel a parte conuersionis, quia conuersio alia simplex, alia per contrapositionem et rursus alia temporaliter, alia alio modo.

reply in that actual consequences are adjoined to necessary ones; surely the next-to-last consequences in each argumentation are actual, while the others seem to be necessary.

But my view — although perhaps it doesn't accept any consequences in any kind of priority, because none of the antecedents of a consequence of itself requires the consequent⁸ — especially criticizes these same next-to-last consequences, which look towards only what is actual. Therefore, here we take 'consequence' only as a matter of association, not as a matter of a condition, and, were we to judge the truth correctly, the association seems to be accommodated to time, *viz.* as long as the sentence puts forward the occurrence of a state of affairs.

But, someone will object, why don't *one* and *two* likewise follow mutually from each other as regards time, namely as long as along with one there exists the other? Or *animal* and *human being*, as long as what is risible continues to exist?

We for our part grant it to be true that these consequences are similarly associated with each other as regards time. But if we were to pay attention to what seems so to people and their way of taking it, which Aristotle follows in particular, the truth of a sentence and the occurrence seem always to be associated, and that this is not said as regards time is because people, not paying attention to the passing of utterances when they deal with sentences for the sake of their sense, always take them as though existent. And 'to be in reality' is able to be true, according to people's way of taking it, just as much as the sentence that says that this is true when they aren't concerned with the transitory character of utterances. Yet "A human being exists" doesn't say the same as "A human being exists' is true": the former proclaims the occurrence of a state of affairs as such, whereas the latter connects truth to a sentence. Otherwise, the one would not be the cause of the other, namely if they were exactly the same.

But although they are different and in truth not always associated with each other, they are still postulated according to the way people take them as always happening together. Utterances are certainly considered in one way according to their significations and in another way according to their essence, as we

⁸ Abelard's line of thought here seems to be that since the antecedent is prior (for some kind of priority) to the consequent, then it can't require the consequence as such, and so fails his modal test for conditionals.

NAM, SI VERA ORATIO EST QUA DICIMUS QUIA EST HOMO, HOMO EST. [Cat. 12 14^b17–18; Arist. lat. 1.1–5 (ed. comp.) 76.16–17]

Vere conuertitur *Homo est*, quia scilicet ita est in re, quod dum VERA EST ORATIO QUA DICITUR quod HOMO EST, HOMO EST. A pari similiter uel a parte conuersionis.

EST AUTEM VERA QUIDEM ORATIO NEQUAQUAM CAUSA QUOD SIT RES, VERUMTAMEN VIDETUR QUODAMMODO CAUSA UT SIT ORATIO VERA. [Cat. 12 14^b18–20; Arist. lat. 1.1–5 (ed. comp.) 76.17–19]

Postquam assignauit mutuam comitationem inter euentum rei et ueritatem propositionis, assignat quid cuius sit causa, euentus scilicet rei causa ueritatis propositionis et ideo naturaliter est prior.

Continuatio: Dixi ueritatem propositionis in comitatione eodem modo se habere ad euentum rei sed non eodem modo se habere in natura, quia scilicet ueritas propositionis non est causa euentus, sicut euentus causa est ipsius. Et hoc est: EST AUTEM etc.

Quod QUODAMMODO CAUSA ideo dicitur quod nulla est de quattuor causis.

have established elsewhere.⁹ For “If a human being exists, truly a human being exists” converts mutually with “‘A human being exists’ is true,” namely because it is so in reality that while a human being exists, the expression by which it is said that a human being exists is true, and it converts because a human being exists (*i. e.* that which is a human being) converts — understand implicitly: converts with the truth of the sentence. The inference is by what is equal or on the side of the conversion, since some conversions are simple and others through contraposition, and again some temporally and others in another way.

FOR, IF THE EXPRESSION BY WHICH WE SAY THAT A HUMAN BEING EXISTS IS TRUE, A HUMAN BEING EXISTS.

“A human being exists” truly converts, namely because it is so in reality that A HUMAN BEING EXISTS so long as THE EXPRESSION BY WHICH IT IS SAID THAT A HUMAN BEING EXISTS IS TRUE. The inference is what is likewise equal, or on the side of the conversion.

HOWEVER, THE TRUE EXPRESSION IS BY NO MEANS THE CAUSE THAT THE THING BE, BUT STILL IT SEEMS IN SOME WAY THE CAUSE THAT THE EXPRESSION BE TRUE.

After Aristotle assigned the mutual association between the occurrence of a state of affairs and the truth of a sentence, he assigns which is the cause of which, namely the occurrence of a state of affairs is the cause of the truth of the sentence, and so is naturally prior.

To continue: I have said that the truth of a sentence is related in the same way in association with the occurrence of a state of affairs, but it isn’t related in the same way in nature, because the truth of the sentence isn’t the cause of the occurrence the way the occurrence is the cause of the truth of the sentence. And this is: HOWEVER *etc.*

(It is called IN SOME WAY THE CAUSE for the reason that it isn’t any of the four causes.)

⁹ See *Logica ‘ingredientibus’* 2 (Geyer 246.4–5).

DUM ENIM RES EST AUT NON EST, VERA ORATIO AUT FALSA DICATUR NECESSE EST. [*Cat.* 12 14^b20–21; *Arist. lat.* 1.1–5 (ed. comp.) 76.19–20]

Vere res est quodammodo causa, quia hoc modo quod propositio inde uera est, quod contingit rem esse uel non esse. A causa uel a parte causae.

Sed hoc loco non irrationabiliter quaeritur, cum illud quod propositio dicit, non sit aliqua essentia, quomodo eam causam appellemus. Quippe causa et effectus a relationibus sumpta esse uidentur, relatio autem uel aliqua proprietas in eo quod omnino non est, esse non potest. Praeterea homine destructo uera est haec propositio *Non est homo*, quia similiter, ut ipse dicit, uera est propositio ex eo quod res non est, sicut ex eo quod est. Sed tunc neque hominem causam neque aliquid proprie dicimus.

Et uerum est quod proprie non dicitur sed magnificatiue, sicut et quando dicimus uictoriam esse causam belli, dum ipsum bellum secundum euentum necdum est uictoria. Nihil enim uictoriae contingere intendimus sed bellum propter illam fieri monstramus. Similiter propositionem ueram esse propter euentum, nihil quidem euentui attribuentes sed propter euentum ueritatem propositioni copulantes, quod fortasse etiam notare uoluit, cum ait euentum quodammodo causam ueritatis propositionis.

IDEOQUE SECUNDUM QUINQUE MODOS PRIUS ALTERUM ALTERO DICITUR. [*Cat.* 12 14^b21–22; *Arist. lat.* 1.1–5 (ed. comp.) 76.20–21]

Quia scilicet secundum istos quinque modos. A partibus. [|294|](#)

FOR WHILE THE THING IS OR IS NOT, THE EXPRESSION MUST BE CALLED TRUE OR FALSE.

Truly a thing is IN SOME WAY THE CAUSE, since this is the way a sentence is true: that the reality happens to be (or not to be). The inference is from the cause, or from part of the cause.

Now at this point it's not unreasonable to raise the question: since what a sentence says is not any thing, how do we call it a cause? Indeed, cause and effect seem to be derived from relations, but there can't be a relation or any property in what doesn't exist at all. Besides, were human beings to be destroyed, the sentence "A human being does not exist" is true, because as the sentence says it is likewise true in virtue of the fact that the thing does not exist, just as "A human being exists is true in virtue of the fact that a human being exists. But then we aren't calling a human being a 'cause' or 'something' correctly.

Well, it's true that we aren't speaking correctly; instead, we're exalting its value,¹⁰ just as when we say that victory is the cause of war: as long as there is war, due to its occurrence there is no victory yet. We don't intend anything to happen to victory, but rather show that the war comes about because of it. Likewise for a sentence to be true because of the occurrence: we aren't attributing anything to the occurrence but connecting truth to the sentence because of the occurrence. Perhaps Aristotle also wanted to note this point when he says that the occurrence IS IN SOME WAY THE CAUSE of the truth of the sentence.

AND SO ONE THING IS SAID TO BE PRIOR TO ANOTHER IN FIVE WAYS.

This is because it is due to these five kinds of priority. The inference is from the parts.

¹⁰ "Instead, we're exalting its value": *sed magnificatiue*, adapted from its biblical use, e.g. Gen. 12:2.

[1] Mirandum est quomodo uox sit genus nominis et nomen dicatur esse cum nulla uox sit. Et concedatur quod haec uox *homo* est nomen et non conceditur quod sit uox. Cum enim nullus loquitur, haec uox esse nomen conceditur quia instituta sed non est uox dum nullus loquitur. [2] Item dicitur quod hoc nomen *homo* est bisyllabum sed tamen nulla syllaba est uel littera, et est bisyllabum et tamen duabus syllabis non constat nec duae syllabae illud constituunt. Cum autem dicimus *Hoc nomen est bisyllabum* sensus est quod institutum est hoc nomen ut duabus syllabis sonantibus constet uel eius prolatio duabus syllabis perficitur. Sed similiter potest concedi quod duabus syllabis constet.

[3] Conceditur a nobis quod ex quo dictiones sunt inuentae, et constructio est instituta de eis statim esse propositionem etsi etiam nullus illas coniungat dictiones; et dicitur quod est uox licet a nullo proferatur. Si autem dicatur quia omnis uox ab animali profertur, intellige ‘ab animali’ indifferenter, uno scilicet uel pluribus. Sed puto quod non est propositio donec dictiones coniunguntur nec uox, et tamen prius est instituta et significatiua quam sit propositio.

[4] Sed contra hoc dicitur quod si non est propositio donec ipsae dictiones in iunctura proferantur, tunc est affirmatio quae non habet negationem; sed omnis affirmatio habet negationem.

[4] Ad quod respondeo quod si de ipsis pronuntiationibus dicatur *Omnis affirmatio habet negationem*, non concedo. Fit enim affirmatio forsitan cuius nunquam fiet negatio. Sed sic est intelligendum: Omni affirmationi est negatio opposita, quod quicquid affirmatur negari potest. Et hoc intelligit Aristoteles cum ait “Contingit omne quod quis affirmauerit negare” [*De int.* 7 17^a30–31 *Arist. lat.* 9.14].” Qui enim de sermonibus nos instruunt ad hoc tendunt ut quibus dictionibus et quomodo iunctis loqui debeamus, ut si quis modo nouam faceret affirmationem, statim scirem quae esset ei danda negatio et dicerem *Haec affirmatio habet negationem hanc*, hoc est de istis uocibus recte fieret eius negatio. Sic Aristoteles etiam, cum ait “Omnium diuidentium necesse est

[1] It’s surprising how *utterance* is the genus of the name, and is said to be a name, since no utterance exists. Let it be granted that the utterance ‘human’ is a name; it is not [thereby] conceded that it is an utterance. For when no one is speaking, it is conceded that this utterance is a name because it has been so instituted, but it is not an utterance while no one is speaking. [2] Again, it is claimed that the name ‘human’ is a bisyllable, but nevertheless no syllable or letter exists, then it is a bisyllable and yet it does not consist in two syllables nor do two syllables constitute it. For when we say “This name is a bisyllable,” the sense is that this name has been so instituted that it consists in two syllables being sounded out, or its speaking is completed in two syllables. But likewise it can be conceded that it consists in two syllables.

[3] For our part, we concede that in the situation in which words are devised, their construction is also straightaway instituted regarding them to be a sentence, even if no one also puts the words together; and we do say that an utterance exists even though it is not spoken by anyone. Yet if it were said that every utterance is spoken by an animal, understand “by an animal” indifferently, namely by one or by many. However, I think that there is neither sentence nor utterance until the words are put together, and yet it is significant and so instituted before there is a sentence.

[4] But against this, the objection is raised that if there is no sentence until these words are spoken joined together, then there is an affirmation which does not have a negation. Yet every affirmation has a negation.

[4] I reply to this objection that if “Every affirmation has a negation” were said of these pronouncements, then I do not concede it. Perhaps an affirmation is framed whose negation is never framed. But it ought to be understood like so: To every affirmation there is an opposite negation, that whatever is affirmed can be denied. This is what Aristotle understands when he says “Anything someone may affirm he can deny.” He who taught us about meaningful words took note of this, namely how we ought to speak with which words and how put together, so that if anyone were now to make a new affirmation I would immediately know what negation could be given for it and I would say “*This* affirmation has *this* negation,” that is, its negation would be framed correctly with these

alteram esse ueram et alteram falsam” [De int. 7 Arist. lat. 11.9-10], non ad ipsas propositiones hoc retorquet sed hoc uult dicere quod necesse est ita esse ut potest affirmatione ostendi ueluti ut negatione potest negari.

[5] Item dicitur quod si sit aliqua propositio, tunc est diuidens alicuius; ergo diuidens illius est.

[6] Quod non concedo. Non enim dico hanc propositionem esse diidentem alicuius propositionis, ideo quod illa alia sit huius diuidens; sed quia haec propositio affirmat uel negat, quod potest affirmari uel negari per propositionem de eisdem sermonibus factam.

[7] Opponitur autem ad hoc quod dicitur esse propositio quando non profertur. Omnis propositio est composita ex aliqua dictione, ergo dictio est pars propositionis, ergo dictio est pars; sed omnis pars est res, ergo dictio est res; sed dictio non est res quando nullus profert eam.

[8] Ad hoc respondetur quod *Omnis propositio est composita ex aliqua dictione* sic est intelligendum quod in prolatione cuiuscumque, quando scilicet profertur ipsa propositio, profertur dictio aliqua; et etiam plusquam ipsa; unde non concluditur quod modo constet inde nec modo sit pars propositionis dictio.

[9] Vel aliter: Omnis propositio semper est ex dictione quia facta est institutio, ut quandocumque proferatur propositio, in ea proferatur dictio. Et dictio est pars propositionis, instituta scilicet ut propositionem possit constituere, id est esse una pars totius prolationis ipsius propositionis. Et hinc non sequitur quod sit pars, scilicet aliquid in aliquo. Sic etiam concedimus primam esse partem diei sed non dicimus primam esse partem nec primam esse, et dicimus diem esse modo sed neque compositum neque simplicem.

[10] Item secundum hoc quod dicitur *Omnis propositio est* et conceditur quod omnis consequentia est, non uidetur uere posse dici *Facio quandam consequentiam*, nam si facio consequentiam, consequentia fit; quod fit non est. Item si facio consequentiam, uel eam quae est uel eam quae non est uel quae fuit uel quae non fuit uel quae est uel quae non erit. Si autem facio eam quae est, tunc ipsa est, et fit; sin uero facio eam quae fuit, tunc iterum erit.

[11] Responde. Cum dico *Facio consequentiam* idem est quod profero conse-

words. Thus Aristotle too, when he says “For all dividing [sentences] one of the two must be true and the other one false,” he is not turning this back to these sentences but wants to say this, that it is necessarily the case that just as it can be shown by an affirmation that it can be denied by a negation.

[5] Again, it is claimed that if some sentence were to exist, then it is the dividing sentence of some pair; thus its dividing counterpart exists.

[6] I do not concede this. For I do not say that this sentence is the dividing counterpart of some sentence for the reason that the other sentence is its dividing counterpart, but rather because this sentence affirms or denies what can be affirmed or denied by a sentence framed in the same terms.

[7] The objection is posed: A sentence is said to exist when it is not spoken. Every sentence is composed out of some word; therefore, a word is part of a sentence; therefore a word is a part. But every part is a thing. Therefore, a word is a thing. But a word is not a thing when no one speaks it.

[8] Reply: The claim “Every sentence is composed out of some word” should be understood in such a way that in speaking such a thing, namely when the sentence is spoken, some word is spoken and also more than it; accordingly, we do not conclude that now it thus exists nor that now the word is part of the sentence. [9] Alternatively: Every sentence always exists in virtue of a word, since its institution was made such that whenever the sentence is spoken a word is spoken in it. And a word is part of a sentence, one instituted so that it can constitute a sentence, that is, to be one part of the total speaking of the sentence. And it does not follow from this that it is a part, namely, something in another. Thus do we also concede that the first part of the day exists, but we do not say that the first is a part nor that it is first; and we say that the day exists now but that it is neither composite nor simple.

[10] Again, it is objected that on this account every sentence exists, and it is conceded that every consequence exists; it seems “I make some consequence” cannot be said truly. For if I make a consequence, the consequence comes to be; what comes to be does not exist. Again, if I make a consequence, it is either one which is or which is not, or was or was not, or will be or will not be. Yet if I make one which is, then it is, and it comes to be; but if I make one which was, then again it will be.

[11] Reply: When I say “I make a consequence” it’s the same as that I am

quentiam; *ergo illa non est*, hoc est non est instituta, falsum est. Nec est contra hoc quod dicitur *Si fit aliquid, non est illud* quia hoc dictum est de statu, scilicet *Si fit alicuius status, non est illius status*; consequentia uero non est status quia ad hoc ut sit consequentia non est necesse ut sit aliqua essentia. Cum autem facio consequentiam, non facio aliquid...⁶

⁶ The text breaks off here.

speaking a consequence; “therefore, it does not exist,” that is, it has not been instituted, is false. Nor is the claim “If something comes to be, it does not exist,” since this is said with regard to a condition — namely, “If the condition of something comes to be, it is not the condition of it”; the consequence is not the condition, for in order to be a consequence it is not necessary that there be any thing. Yet when I make a consequence, I do not make...